

been possessed and moulded by the Spirit of God in this present world, that it will not only persist but also enlarge—everlastingly—in knowledge and love, clothed in glory and honor and immortality, in the very presence of God? This personal life is designated in Scripture as the life of the spirit that is in man. In the words of the “writing” of Hezekiah, the great reformer-king of Judah, “O Lord, by these things men live; and wholly therein is the life of my spirit: wherefore recover thou me, and make me to live” (Isa. 38:16). “By these things men live,” that is, “the things which thou speakest and doest” (v. 15); “wholly therein is the life of my spirit.” “Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God” (Matt. 4:4; Deut. 8:3). The personal life of man—the life of the spirit that is in him—was breathed into him at creation; that is to say, it was imparted to him by the procession of the Spirit from the Being of God. It is an endowment of the Breath of God. God is a Spirit, and man is essentially spirit; he is therefore the image and likeness of God. But, as Bergson has put it, man in his present state is only “partially himself.” He is the *personal*, but not yet wholly the *moral*, image of his Creator. The true Food, therefore, for the spirit that is in him—the Food by partaking of which constantly he may become god-like, and therefore wholly himself—the Food by partaking of which he may attain “unto a fullgrown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ” (Eph. 4:13) who is Himself “the effulgence of God’s glory, and the very image of his substance” (Heb. 1:3)—that true Food is the living Word of the living God. By partaking of that Food, digesting it, assimilating it, making it the very warp and woof of his character, he grows in grace and in the knowledge of God, he is possessed by the Spirit of God, he lives in this present world the life of the Spirit, and ultimately attains holiness—wholeness—in the very presence of God. This—Beatitude, the Life Everlasting—is man’s natural and proper ultimate end; and the attainment of this end by the saints of God will mark the culmination and the consummation of the whole Creative Process.

## 7. The Mystery of the Person

At the lowest or inanimate level of being, the procession of the Spirit from the Being of God brought into existence *energy*—the first form of which was, in all probability, radiant energy or light—which transmuted itself into matter in motion. In

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modern physics, as we have already seen, there is no "solid matter." If a material object looks "solid" to us, it does so only because the motion of its matter is too rapid or too minute to be sensed. It is "solid" only in the sense that a rapidly rotating color chart is "white" or a rapidly spinning top is "standing still."

At the second level, as we ascend in the scale of total being, the procession of the Spirit resulted in the implanting of the life principle in the first plant form. This remains true just the same, whether this life principle was a something *added to* the basic physiochemical processes, or whether it consisted in *the effectuating of a certain arrangement* between the basic physiochemical units or elements.

At the third level of being, the procession of the Spirit added to the life (vegetative) principle in the plant the powers of sensitivity characteristic of animal life, those powers which make consciousness possible. Thus the writer of *Ecclesiastes* differentiates between the "spirit of man" and the "spirit of the beast." In a mood of depression he exclaims:

For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; and man hath no preeminence above the beasts: for all is vanity. All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again. Who knoweth the spirit of man, whether it goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast, whether it goeth downward to the earth? (Ecc. 3:19-21).

In a subsequent chapter, however, in contemplation of death the same writer's faith emerges in a triumphant answer to his own question: "the dust returneth unto the earth as it was, and the spirit [of man] returneth unto God who gave it" (Ecc. 12:7). That is to say, man is more than animal: he is animal *plus*.

And so, at the fourth level of being, the procession of the Spirit added to all previously imparted powers the attributes and potencies of a *person*. The result was a human being created "in the image of God." Hence it is expressly asserted in Scripture (1) that there is a spirit in man, and (2) that God is, in a strictly natural sense of course, the Father of our spirits.

Job 32:8—There is a spirit in man, and the breath of the Almighty giveth them understanding. Zech. 12:1—Thus saith Jehovah, who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundation of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him. Heb. 12:9—Furthermore, we had the fathers of our flesh to chasten us, and we gave them reverence; shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of spirits, and live?

Now it seems quite probable that, speaking ontologically, the spirit in man embraces essentially all the powers of the Subconscious. In this present state, however, it embraces also the operations of the intellect, affections, and will, by means of which it—the ontological being—relates itself to its present environment. This latter aspect of spirit, which I have chosen to designate the *mind*, will, of course, have been left behind for ever when the spirit *per se*—the true “inner man”—shall have been freed from the limitations of time and space as a result of the dissolution of the physical form in which it is now tabernacled. Again, as man is presently constituted, all his characteristically spiritual powers or faculties are also comprehended in the term *person*, the designation by which, for centuries, man has been specified in the language of human thought. Those natural attributes which distinguish spirit in man from spirit in beast are (1) reason, (2) self-consciousness, (3) self-determination, (4) the subconscious powers previously described, and, in consequence of all these (5) the potentiality of holiness. All these may also rightly be said to be the essential attributes of a person. Thus either the *spirit*, or the *person*, or even the *self*, may be said to be the carrier, so to speak, of the personality. That is to say, all three terms designate the same reality which survives all change. Whether named the “spirit,” the “person,” or the “self,” or even the “inner man,” it is the essential or ontological human being that is designated. Therefore all these terms shall be used interchangeably in the present treatise.

Thus every normal human being *as such* is from the time of his conception, either in potency or in actuality, a *person*. This is his specific designation—that which specifies his position in the scale of total being, and which at the same time signifies the aggregate of all those attributes heretofore mentioned which differentiate him from the lower orders. I think that the great majority of scientists would agree to this designation and to the implications here stated as suggested by it.

In so far as his adaptation to his present environment is concerned, however, man is specified, *i.e.*, set apart as a species, especially by his power of reason. Although he shares with the sub-human orders the vegetative, sensory, and locomotive powers, it is the faculty of reason which sets him apart from the rest of creation and gives him a standing and dignity all his own. Indeed this fact is implicit in the present-day scientific use of the term *homo sapiens*. Whether he makes proper use of the power or not—and in many cases it must be admitted that he

does not, but allows, rather, his reason to be controlled by his emotions, ambitions, and prejudices—nevertheless he does possess the power and possess it obviously to a far greater degree than any brute possesses or ever could possess it. The brute, of course, is governed by instinct, but instinct is quite another thing from intellection. As a matter of fact, no one knows what instinct really is: someone has rightly called it “the great sphinx of Nature.” In its qualities of adaptation and unerringness it would seem to best explained as the providential operation of Universal Intelligence, the means by which God cares for His non-rational creatures. The power of reason characteristic of man, however, is something else altogether. It is the power (1) of thinking connectedly, or from *this to that*, etc., and (2) of thinking purposefully, that is, toward foreknown and fore-chosen ends; as Dr. John Dewey would have it, real thinking is problem-solving. Now this power of reason is that specific power which differentiates a *person* from all other creatures of earth. Hence Boethius’ classic definition of a person as “an individual substance of a rational nature” is perhaps the best, from the metaphysical point of view, that has ever been formulated. [*Persona est substantia individua rationalis naturae.* Boethius was a Roman philosopher who lived about 484-520, and who became a convert to Christianity. His philosophy was fundamentally Aristotelian.]

Even granting the validity of the hypothesis that man is the end-product of a long-drawn-out process of organic,<sup>2</sup> the fact still remains that he has advanced beyond the level of the brute. This has to be true, if biological evolution has actually taken place; that is to say, if man has really *evolved* from the brute, he is *more than* brute; he is, so to speak, animal *plus*. And the plus would seem to consist essentially in his power of thinking connectedly or reasoning in terms of his own experience. This is a truth which seems to have been overlooked all too frequently by the biologists; their tendency to treat man as an animal, and as an animal only, has brought about untold confusion especially in the field of morals. Man is not merely an animal; he is, as Aristotle said many centuries ago, a *rational* animal, and no amount of “scientific” casuistry will ever alter the fact. [My personal objections to the evolution hypothesis are stated at the end of this volume.]

I should like to take the opportunity at this point to protest strenuously against the all too general tendency that has prevailed in scientific circles recently to try to reduce man to

the status of the brute. Psychologists, physiologists, neurologists, and especially endocrinologists, have put forward the most fantastic conclusions and claims in recent years—claims based entirely on the results of experiments with animals. As a consequence of their too ready application to human beings of the results of such experiments, these experimenters have shown themselves unduly prone to fall into certain very grave errors, as, *e.g.*, that of making an omnibus term of the word "personality," and that, consequently, of confusing personality with temperament. The behavior of animals may indeed show a variation in temperamental characteristics, but to speak of their having "personality traits" is certainly an illegitimate extension of the term "personality," an extension that is justified neither by the exigencies of language nor by the facts in the case. Temperament is not personality, either in animals or in man. This error of attributing "personality" to the brute, however, is one that occurs in many current scientific textbooks. Even the term "animal psychology" is misleading, to say the least. These facts lead me to observe, in passing, that a great deal of confusion could be avoided in modern education if scientists in general would only familiarize themselves with, and follow, the Socratic twofold injunction to all thinkers, namely, (1) first to define the terms they propose to use in any field of scientific investigation, and (2) having defined those terms, to use them univocally thereafter. Words are, of course, the means of communicating thought among persons; only persons are *known* to have evolved language. But at the same time words can, and often do, become prolific sources of mental confusion as a result of equivocal usage. And through the overlapping of terms, modern scientific "universe of discourse" has in many instances become a veritable Babel. "Personality," for example, is a term that should be confined strictly to human beings. Animals, of course, appear to manifest certain forms of behavior which are commonly thought to be characteristic of a person. This is true especially of their "emotional" reactions (whatever the term "emotion" may signify: it has never been clearly defined). But—I repeat—it is an illegitimate extension of the term "personality" to speak of any single animal—and personality is a mystery that is invariably tied up with individuality—as being a "personality," or as having "personality" or "personality traits." By no stretch of the imagination can a brute animal properly be designated a person; and only a person—that is, if we are going to speak univocally—can rightly be considered a carrier of personality.

I should like to point out too that even among human beings "personality types" become more clearly differentiated only in the field of abnormal psychology; and, as a matter of fact, psychologists themselves have never been able to agree upon any such differentiation among normal persons, among whom it seems likely that no such precise differentiation exists. Moreover, this view of man as a sort of "glorified brute" is, as previously stated, largely responsible for the current world-wide confusion in ethical theory and practice. Indeed it is frequently offered as an alibi for looseness in morals; we should not hesitate, we are told, to give free expression to our "natural" impulses and desires. And thus human morality is prostituted into "barn-yard morality," which, if universalized, would destroy the race. Devotion to this Cult of Self-Expression may explain why some of our modern writers have expressed themselves in such illiterate language, as, for example, Theodore Dreiser; it may explain, too, some of the terrible gobs hanging on the walls of our art galleries today. They are supposed to be artistic expressions—but one wonders, of what? I commend Oedipus' terrific oracle to all those who hold this brute interpretation of man: "May'st thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art!"

Man is characterized by self-consciousness and self-determination, and by the capacity for holiness, the properties of a *person*. Hence no society regards the brute as a person, for the obvious reason that no brute animal manifests these characteristics, at least not in sufficient degree to be regarded as a person. True, a parrot can be taught to vocalize "I" but no mere animal was ever known to say of its own accord, meaningfully to itself, "I am a parrot," or "I am a pig," etc. If it could, it would no longer be a parrot or a pig. Moreover, no man can ever know to what extent an animal "thinks" or "feels," for the obvious reason that no man can "put himself into an animal's skin," so to speak, in such a manner as to know what the experiences of an animal are. A thoroughgoing comparison of animal and human experience simply cannot be obtained. But every man can, by looking into himself, know what he thinks and feels and wills. And every man can and does know that he cannot teach his old dog Rover, or his old horse Dobbin, either the Ten Commandments or the elementary theorems of plane geometry. In view of all these facts, it must be obvious that such terms as "animal mind," "animal personality," "animal psychology," and the like, are not only misleading but downright illegitimate.

Psychologists seem never to have awakened to the fact that

before there can be such a thing as "behavior" or "adaptation," there must be an entity capable of "behaving" and of "adapting" itself. Hence the need of a widespread revival of what is called "personalistic psychology" at the present time—a psychology which returns to the fundamental concept of man as a *person* and treats him as such. This is as it should be, for the simple and obvious reason that man is a person.

Dr. Gordon W. Allport summarizes the arguments put forward by personalists in psychology to support their position, as follows:

1. Without the co-ordinating concept of person (or some equivalent, such as Self or Ego), it is impossible to account for, or even to depict, the interaction of mental processes upon one another. Memory affects perception, desire influences meaning, meaning determines action, and action shapes memory; so on, indefinitely. This constant interpenetration takes place within some *boundary*, and the boundary is the Person; it occurs for some purpose, and the purpose can be represented only in terms of service to the Person.
2. The phenomenon of mental *organization* can have no significance unless it is viewed as taking place within a definite framework. Mental states do not organize themselves nor lead independent existences; their arrangement always constitutes part of a larger arrangement—the personal life. "Everything mental is a totality or a part of a totality."
3. Such concepts as *function*, *adaptation*, *use*, and *adjustment*, are of no significance without reference to the Person. An adaptation must be the adapting of something to something: so with adjustment. Use and function likewise imply an interested personal agent.
4. Above all, it is in immediate experience that the case for a central co-ordinating agent becomes unanswerable. The central position of Self is implied in all states of consciousness. Descartes' dictum, *Cogito ergo sum*, can hardly be refuted. This argument, though cast in metaphysical terms, has psychological support in the vivid sense of the self present in experiences of strain, conflict, and choice.
5. Another argument stresses the *creative* properties of the Person or Self. Every system of thought originates with someone. The most objective of scientists, no less than philosophers, ultimately create or "will" the canons of their own science. Disagreements result in the last analysis from the individuality of their own minds. So too with psychologists. If they embrace a nomothetic positivism and empty the personality of all its bothersome individuality, they do so ultimately because they *want* to. Thus a prior act of volition is responsible for the austere limits they place upon their own speculation. We all build our scientific world from the symbols taken from our own personalities. Which then is the prior fact, the creative person or the creed he creates?!

Personalistic psychologists, Allport goes on to say, agree that *psychology*,

whose task it is to treat the whole of mental life, cannot possibly discharge its duty without relating the states and processes it studies to the Person who is their originator, carrier, and regulator. There can

1. G. W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*, 550-551.

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be no adjustment without someone to adjust, no organization without an organizer, no memory without self-continuity, no learning without a change in the person, no knowledge without a knower, and no valuing without someone possessed of desires and the capacity to evaluate. Psychology must take seriously James's dictum that every mental operation occurs in a "personal form," and must take it more seriously than James himself did.<sup>1</sup>

The Self is, of course, a mystery. Are "Self," "Ego," "Person," all synonymous terms? Is the Self made of body-mind? Is the real Self identical with "spirit" in man? Is it exclusively "spiritual," and dwelling in a body? I quote again from Allport, whose analysis is most penetrating and difficult to improve upon:

To be sure, the sense of self is a peculiarly elusive datum for introspection. To catch it for direct examination in consciousness seemed to James like trying to step one's shadow. In Brentano's terms, the Self, though ever present, is a matter of "secondary" awareness. Primarily I am conscious of the object to which I attend: a tone, a landscape, a menacing gesture; only secondarily am I aware that it is I who am apprehending, admiring, or fearing these objects. The situation becomes even more elusive when the Self is regarded not only as Knower (reflected to itself somehow in a "secondary awareness"), but also as the *ground* for that which is known. I not only know that it is I who perceive an object, but I feel that this object has some special significance for *me*. The intimacy of the whole conscious process is baffling, a cause of consternation to philosophers and psychologists alike. The point is that this very intimacy is one of the chief arguments in support of personalistic psychology.<sup>2</sup>

Again:

The Person, like the Self, is *persistent*; *changes* as it develops; is *unique*; is *many-sided*; is the *groundwork* of all its own experiences; and is related to its physical and social environment.<sup>3</sup>

Although personality is the one fact with which we are most intimately acquainted, at the same time it is the most mysterious thing we know. The following exquisite bit of literature from the pen of Ernest Dimnet is especially pertinent at this point:

"Something mysterious in being a person! Why, I never thought there was anything mysterious about that. Yet I have been a person for some time.

"Are you sure that you have never felt the mysteriousness of being a person? Didn't you, as a child, ask questions which showed that you really did feel it?

"Oh! You mean the silly questions which children do ask; Why am I Johnny and not Tommy?—Why am I not a tree?—Couldn't I have

1. *Op. cit.*, 551-552.

2. *Ibid.*, note 2.

3. *Ibid.*, 557.

been one?—How can I be anybody with God being everywhere? All children say these absurd silly things.

"They are not silly, Heaven knows! When children sound silly, you will always find that it is in imitation of their elders. But even grown-ups will sometimes be conscious of the strangeness of being a person. It may only be a few times in their lives, and it may only be in flashes, but practically everybody has had that experience, and most people are awed by it. Have you never been conscious of the space occupied by your body and how inconsiderable it is?

*Oh! Of displacing that little space with me, as I walk and of being shut up in it? Why, many times!*

"That is the sensation I mean. You are then within an ace of realizing that you are an exceedingly fragile bundle of phenomena, supported, in some unaccountable way, by a centre, a core which you cannot locate, your Ego.

*"Why, I realize that very well, and it IS frightening. All the strength we might derive from the consciousness that we are ourselves is paralyzed by the realization that what makes us a person is, as you say, so slender and impalpable. The more we think of it, the more it seems to shrink INTO itself, till we are afraid to see it thinning into nothing. I know that feeling of evanescence very well.*

"No doubt, for you describe it pretty well, too.

*"But why is it frightening like that?"*

"Probably because it is the foretaste of our death. What is death? The completeness of the phenomenon you describe. The support of our personality vanishes, and suddenly it is independent of its familiar phenomena. The simile of the soap-bubble is well chosen. The more we think of our personality, the more afraid we are to see the bubble dissolve into the brilliant morning.

*"Yes, evidently we dread to move from the outside world which supports us, so far inward that we shall be conscious of nothing but our ephemeral selves. I once met at a gloomy boarding-house near the British Museum, a weird old sea-captain whom what we are saying causes me to remember. He had never known, he assured me, anybody brave enough to go to a lonely place at night, and to call his own name out loud three times. Realizing one's own personality in that way, no matter how simple, he thought was beyond human endurance."*<sup>1</sup>

It should be remembered, however, that this moving from the outside world which supports one, into the inner world of the Self is, in fact, a moving out of the limited world of more or less illusion into the apparently illimitable world of reality. As stated heretofore, the physical senses limit one's experience to the circumstances of the external environment. Once the person (spirit) is liberated from this objectivity, he is free to "roam the universe," so to speak. Intimations of the illimitableness of this inner world may be found in dreams, in which the dreamer often re-enacts, in an instant or two of mathematical "time," the experiences of a whole period of his life, or travels from one locale to another far distant without any sense of intervening distance or space whatsoever. Even in one's waking hours, one's thoughts transcend both time and space.

1. Ernest Dimnet, *What We Live By*, 16-17.

When I look at a distant star, for example, at what point in space does the perception take place? Does it take place within me, or does it take place where the light from the star is, at the moment of my seeing it? Or does it take place in space at all? Is "mind" a something necessarily confined to body, or is it an activity of the person that outreaches all measurements of time, distance, and space? Obviously, there is but one answer: The "inner man"—being himself the image of God—knows none of the limitations of the physical world. And death is, in the final analysis, but the stepping out of the limited illusory world of the flesh, into the unlimited real world of the spirit.

1. *A person is, in the first place, a unity.* Illingworth writes:

The fundamental characteristic of personality is self-consciousness, the quality in a subject of becoming an object to itself, or, in Locke's language, "considering itself as itself," and saying, "I am I." But as in the very act of becoming thus self-conscious I discover in myself desires, and a will, the quality of self-consciousness immediately involves that of self-determination, the power of making my desires an object of my will, and saying, "I will do what I desire." But we must not fall into the common error of regarding thought, desire, and will, as really separable in fact, because we are obliged for the sake of distinctness to give them separate names. They are three faculties or functions of one individual, and, though logically separable, interpenetrate each other, and are always more or less united in operation. I cannot, for instance, pursue a train of thought, however abstract, without attention, which is an act of *will*, and involves a *desire* to attend. I cannot desire, as distinct from merely feeling appetite, like an animal, without *thinking* of what I desire, and *willing* to attain or abstain from it. I cannot will without *thinking* of an object or purpose, and *desiring* its realization. There is, therefore, a synthetic unity in my personality or self; that is to say, not a merely numerical oneness, but a power of uniting opposite and alien attributes and characteristics with an intimacy which defies analysis.<sup>1</sup>

Cases of so-called multiple personality are probably not, after all, what the name implies, but are, rather, instances of disconnected allotments of experiential data which need reintegration to effect a restoration of the original unity. About one hundred such cases have been reported at widely separated times and in different parts of the world, the most celebrated of which perhaps was the case of Sally Beauchamp, reported by Dr. Morton Prince in his book entitled *The Dissociation of a Personality*, published in 1920. The basic problem involved in this phenomenon is that of how suggestion becomes so effective and dissociation so complete in these individuals. Two contemporary psychologists have this to say on the subject:

1. J. R. Illingworth, *Personality, Human and Divine*, Shilling Edition, 28-29.

If, by way of analogy, one conceives of consciousness as being made up of many interlacing streams of thought, then some of these may meet obstacles in the form of emotional conflicts or fixations and form whirlpools which separate from the main currents of thought. When large and powerful, they may assume the form of secondary personalities, any one of which may become dominant under certain conditions.<sup>1</sup>

Whatever the true explanation of this phenomenon may be, the fact remains that it belongs to the field of *abnormal* psychology, whereas we are considering here normal persons only. (It will be remembered that Dr. Prince was himself successful in re-integrating the personality of Sally Beauchamp.) Besides, even in cases of "dual" or "multiple" personality, the subliminal self may remain unified beneath the phenomena of exterior dissociation. Moreover, we must not lose sight of the distinction between the person as the ontological being, and the personality which is constructed out of hereditary and environmental factors and the personal reactions thereto; the former is, in the nature of the case, one, whereas the latter may indeed exhibit lack of integration or evidences even of disintegration. A person is essentially a unity.

2. *A person is, in the second place, a persistent unity.* The "I" persists through all changes, physical and mental. As Illingworth goes on to say:

This unity is further emphasized by my sense of personal identity, which irresistibly compels me to regard myself as one and the same being, through all my changes of time and circumstance, and thus unites my thoughts and feelings of today with those of all my bygone years. I am thus one, in the sense of an active unifying principle, which can not only combine a multitude of present experiences in itself, but can also combine its present with its past.<sup>2</sup>

Memory seems to be both the basis and the guarantee of personal identity. Remembering, as William James put it, is something more than the mere dating of an event in the past; it is the dating of an event in *my* past. As St. Augustine wrote, centuries ago:

I come to the fields and spacious palaces of my memory, where are the treasures of innumerable images, brought in from things of all sorts perceived by the senses. . . . Nor yet do the things themselves enter in; only the images of the things perceived are there in readiness, for thought to recall. . . . It is I myself who remember, I the mind. . . . Great is the power of memory, a fearful thing, O my God, a deep and boundless manifoldness; and this thing is the mind, and this am I myself. What am I then, O my God? What nature am I? A life various and manifold, and exceeding immense!<sup>3</sup>

1. Carney Landis and M. Marjorie Bolles, *Textbook of Abnormal Psychology*, 98.

2. *Op. cit.*, 29-30.

3. *Confessions*, Pusey translation, Everyman's Library, 210-219.

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One inescapable fact of human experience is that personal identity persists through all changes in the organism, a fact which confirms our faith that it will survive the last great change, the dissolution of the body.

3. *A person is, in the third place, a unique unity.* Says Illingworth:

At the same time, with all my inclusiveness, I have also an exclusive aspect. "Each self," it has been well said, "is a unique existence, which is perfectly impervious to other selves—impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue." Thus a person has at once an individual and a universal side. He is a unit that excludes all else, and yet a totality or whole with infinite powers of inclusion.<sup>1</sup>

Allport writes:

The outstanding characteristic of man is his individuality. He is a unique creation of the forces of nature. Separated spatially from all other men he behaves throughout his own particular span of life in his own distinctive fashion. It is not upon the cell nor upon the single organ, nor upon the group, nor upon the species that nature has centered her most lavish concern, but rather upon the integral organization of life processes into the amazingly stable and self-contained system of the individual living creature. . . . The *person* who is a unique and never-repeated phenomenon evades the traditional scientific approach at every step. . . . Whether he [the scientist] delimits his science as the study of the mind, the soul, of behavior, purpose, consciousness, or human nature—the persistent, indestructible fact of organization in terms of individuality is always present.<sup>2</sup>

J. C. Smuts has this to say:

Personality is the latest and supreme whole which has arisen in the holistic series of evolution. It is a new structure built on the prior structures of matter, life, and mind. . . . Mind is its most important and conspicuous constituent. But the body is also very important and gives the intimate flavor of humanity to Personality. . . . The ideal Personality only arises where Mind irradiates Body and Body nourishes Mind, and the two are one in their mutual transfiguration.<sup>3</sup>

Nature is individualistic: we come into the world *one by one*, and we go out of it *one by one*; and while in it, each human individual is a unique one. As Emerson has said: "Nature never rhymes her children nor makes two men alike." My potentialities, thoughts, memories, desires, decisions, likes and dislikes, all belong to *me*; in the very nature of the case I cannot transfer them to anyone else. Nature's provision, moreover, is directed primarily toward the welfare of the individual; even the state, in the Providence of God, exists to benefit the individual. Hence,

1. *Op. cit.*, 30.

2. *Op. cit.*, 3, 5.

3. *Holism and Evolution*, 261, 262.

said Jesus, one human life is of infinitely greater value than the whole material world: "For what shall a man be profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and forfeit his life? or what shall a man give in exchange for his life?" (Matt. 16:26). The reason for this high evaluation of a human soul is obvious: every person is an image and likeness of God.

4. *A person is, in the fourth place, a transcendent unity.* A person, in knowing and evaluating and utilizing material things, however imperfectly, transcends the whole material order. Despite shallow and thoughtless observations to the contrary, the fact remains that our world is, and will always be, anthropocentric; anthropocentric, that is, in the sense that every person is the center of his own world, the world of his own experience. [Actually, the Totality of Things may best be described as *theocentric*.] And there is no evidence that any other creature of earth possesses the ability to reflect upon, or to resolve the problem—for himself at least—of his place in, or relation to, the Totality of Things. *Adaptation to environment*, for man, means infinitely more than mere adaptation to one's immediate family, neighborhood, state or nation: it means, for the thinking person, adaptation to the Universal Order, that is, a satisfactory philosophy of life. Man alone is capable of evolving for himself a *Weltanschauung*. Again I quote from Illingworth:

Personality is the gateway through which all knowledge must inevitably pass. Matter, force, energy, ideas, time, space, law, freedom, cause, and the like, are absolutely meaningless phrases except in the light of our personal experience.<sup>1</sup>

And again:

Now the significance of all this is that we are spiritual beings. The word spirit is indeed undefinable and may even be called indefinite, but it is not a merely negative term for the opposite of matter. It has a sufficiently distinct connotation for ordinary use. It implies an order of existence which transcends the order of sensible experience, the material order: yet which, so far from excluding the material order, includes and elevates it to higher use, precisely as the chemical includes and transfigures the mechanical, or the vital the chemical order. It is thus synonymous with supernatural, in the strict sense of the term. And personality . . . belongs to this spiritual order, the only region in which self-consciousness and freedom can have place.<sup>2</sup>

Personality, that which fills the capacities and actuates the potentialities of the person, is the supreme mystery of being, yet the most real thing in human experience. Nothing can ever be

1. *Op. cit.*, 25.

2. *Ibid.*, 45.

quite so real to me as my own thoughts, my own desires, my own will.

Thus it will be seen that spirit in man includes at least the following: (1) all the powers of the Subconscious, (2) the objective power of reason, (3) self-consciousness, memory, and personal identity, (4) self-determination, and, in consequence of all these powers, (5) the capacity for holiness, for man's becoming *entirely himself*.

A word is in order here about the relation of the person's power of self-determination—freedom of will, as it is commonly called—to his attainment of holiness. Dr. Glenn Negley says:

The individual is both a Physical Man and a Social Man, and he cannot ignore either area of his existence. It is precisely the adjustment of these two factors into a harmonious unity that describes what is meant by personality, and the final category of the Individual aspect may be called *Person*.<sup>1</sup>

He then adds:

I suggest that *Liberty* is the concept most appropriate to Person. As a value principle Liberty means, briefly, the guarantee to individuals of as much freedom of thought and action as is consistent with the exercise of an equal freedom by other men.<sup>2</sup>

But what, precisely, is self-determination, freedom of will, liberty?

Freedom of will, of course, definitely is *not* action without motive; on the contrary, human action invariably proceeds from motives. Free will, moreover, is always exercised within a framework of heredity and environment. The extent of a person's knowledge is necessarily determined by his environment; certainly he cannot will to achieve an end which is utterly unknown to him. An African pigmy, for example, who has never heard of ice, who knows nothing at all about ice, certainly would never think, wish or plan to go skating. Alternative choices are presented to the person by the circumstances of his environment, and the ends for which he strives necessarily lie within the circumference of the knowledge afforded him by that environment. Free will means, in a word, *immunity from necessity within the framework in which choice can be made*; it means that the person who chooses to pursue one course of action could have elected either not to act at all or to pursue an alternative course of action. It means simply that *the motive which prevails, out of two or more alternative and perhaps con-*

1. *The Organization of Knowledge*, 79.

2. *Ibid.*, 85.

*flicting appeals, is the motive that is more closely in harmony with the individual will.* In every choice, three factors are present: that of heredity, that of environment, and that of the personal reaction. Determinists, of course, are those gentlemen who are *determined* (i.e., necessitated) to deny the operation of the last-named factor; in short, those who are *determined* to be *determinists*.

Now the question has often been asked: Why did God so constitute man as to endow him with the potentiality of evil as well as of good? Or, to put it in a simpler form, Why did He not create man incapable of sinning? Frankling admitting that this problem involves a basic element of mystery that perhaps will never be penetrated by human intelligence in its present state—the age-old mystery of the origin of evil—I answer, however, that one fact stands out as obvious, namely, that had the Creator brought into existence a creature incapable of sinning, *that creature would not have been a person.* Sin, of course, is choosing to disobey, rather than to obey, the Word of God; it is choosing one's own way above God's way of doing things. 1 John 3:4—"Sin is lawlessness." Now a creature incapable of making such a choice simply would not be a man, for self-determination is specifically the property of a person, and man is a person. Hence, we can only conclude that man was constituted a person by the Creator for a specific Divine purpose or end. That Divine end, the end which was known to God from the beginning, the end which every human being is ordered by the Divine Thought, Love, and Will to attain, the only end which can fully satisfy all his capacities and potencies, is ultimate union of the human will with the Divine Will in knowledge and love. This is man's absolutely ultimate natural and proper intrinsic end, and his ultimate real Good. As his ultimate intrinsic *perfective* Good, it is Wholeness or Holiness; as his ultimate intrinsic *delectable* Good, it is Beatitude or Blessedness. In the never-to-be-forgotten words of St. Augustine: "Thou awakest us to delight in Thy praise; for Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it repose in Thee." This is not only the testimony of the most profound human thought, but the clear teaching of the Scriptures as well.

But what is holiness, and how is man to attain it? For one thing, holiness is not innocence. Innocence is a *negative* condition of complete inexperience of temptation and sin, a state of untried childhood, to speak by way of analogy. Holiness, on the other hand, is a condition of experienced but *positively*

repudiated temptation and sin. It is a life *actively* lived in conformity with the Word of God, motivated solely by one's love for God. It is the life of the Spirit—the life of the human spirit yielded in loving obedience to the guidance of the indwelling Holy Spirit. Holiness, in short, presupposes the power of self-determination actively exercised in the direction of righteousness, and righteousness is simply doing right, doing what God would have us to do. Holiness is the cultivation, actively, of a disposition to please God in all things, purely out of the love for God in one's heart. Hence it is obvious that a necessary connection exists—that of *means to end*—between freedom of will and holiness; furthermore, that only a *person* can become or be holy in the strict sense of that term.

Plato, in his great cosmological treatise, the *Timaeus*, pictures the Demiourgos, the Divine Reason, as having overruled Necessity (which he designates the Errant Cause) by persuasion, rather than by compulsion, in the process of fashioning the Cosmos. The Divine Reason, in other words, was confronted by a factor which was not wholly under His control and which partly thwarted His benevolent purpose. Indeed it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise in any undertaking that is *purposive*; purposiveness *necessarily* embraces the adaptation of indispensable means to given ends. As Dr. F. M. Cornford writes, in commenting on this Platonic conception:

The necessity lies in the links connecting the purposing will at the beginning of the chain with the attainment of the purpose at the end; we need not think of it as extending further in either direction. Reason and will are conditioned by this concatenation of indispensable means. So it is with the craftsman. If I wish to cut wood, I must make my saw of iron, not of wax. Iron has certain properties of its own, indispensable for my purpose. On the other hand, I can take advantage of this very fact to attain my end. I can make use of those properties to cut wood, though the iron in itself would just as soon cut my throat.<sup>1</sup>

All this implies, of course, that even Omnipotence, in any ordered system, is limited to some extent by purposiveness; the prerequisite of the achievement of a purpose is the indispensability of specific means to the forechosen end. Now as Christians, our conviction, justified both by reason and by Scripture teaching, is that God created the world and man purposefully; that the Divine end in creation is the ultimate establishment of a holy redeemed race of immortals in the new heavens and new earth

*Confessions*, I, 1, Pusey Translation, Everyman's Library.  
1. *Plato's Cosmology*, 174.

wherein dwelleth righteousness (2 Pet. 3:13)—a race fitted to have fellowship with Infinite Holiness Himself. Granting, then, that the glorified and immortalized saint is the end-product of the whole Creative Process, the end-product divinely foreseen and foreordained from the beginning, it is difficult to see how even Omnipotence Himself could have achieved the production of this end-product without having created the natural person endowed with self-consciousness and self-determination, *the indispensable means to sainthood*. In a word, the relation between freedom of will and holiness is that of the indispensable means to a divinely predetermined end. Hence, our God created man first a person, in order that he might become a saint, and, in addition, provided him with all the necessary means of achieving sainthood. Therefore, although a person must “work out his own salvation with fear and trembling,” at the same time “it is God who worketh in him both to will and to work, for his good pleasure” (Phil. 2:12-13). The result is that man alone, of all creatures of earth, is capable of ultimate union with God, ultimate holiness, Everlasting Life.

## QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW OF PART TWO

1. What is our approach to an understanding of the term “spirit”?
2. List some of the more common definitions of matter.
3. In what two categories do we classify “the stuff” of things?
4. Explain what is meant by the cosmic “substance.”
5. State some of the earliest concepts of the cosmic “substance.”
6. What was the ancient theory of the four “elements”?
7. State the theory of Demokritos and Epikouros.
8. State what is meant by Plato’s dualism.
9. State the main features of Plato’s story of the Creation.
10. What was the theory of matter held by Plotinus? What is meant by Creation by Emmanation?
11. State Aristotle’s *hylomorphic* theory.
12. Explain (1) *materia prima* and (2) “substantial form.”
13. Explain the “light metaphysics” of the early Oxford philosophers.
14. What are the three processes involved in immortalization? Explain.
15. What is the essential property of matter, according to Descartes?
16. What were the discoveries of Boyle and Lavoisier?
17. Explain the “building block” theory of the atom. Who originated it?
18. What is the present-day theory of the atom?
19. State the conclusions of the latest physical science in regard to the constitution of matter.
20. Explain what is meant by the Einsteinian theory of energy and matter.
21. Explain what is meant by “maximum entropy.”
22. What is meant by the “ether”? What is the present-day view about it?
23. What is the quantum theory?
24. What significance is there in the fact that our most modern con-