ner, the additional and accompanying phenomena of *perception*, of *consciousness* of the sensation and of the sense-perceived object, and of the *meaning* which thought, by the aid of memory, may attach to the sensation, and even the utilization of the word or *symbol* which linguistic convention has associated with that particular meaning. Not one of these attendant phenomena can be identified strictly with the sensation itself, yet all of them are, in some unexplainable manner, bound up with it. This is especially true in the experience of a *person* or *spirit*. We shall therefore look into these accompanying phenomena further, in a subsequent examination of the processes of thought. For sensation undoubtedly provides the raw material for thought.

3. The Mystery of Consciousness

The phenomenon of sensation is inextricably interwoven with those of *perception* and *consciousness*, and all three are related to the greater and over-all phenomenon of *meaning*.

A sensation is an event in the neurosensory system. It is a *physiological* event. Undoubtedly the raw material of knowledge is provided by *sense-perception*. Faith itself, we are told by the Apostle, "cometh of hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ" (Rom. 10:17). "It was God's good pleasure through the foolishness of the preaching to save them that believe" (1 Cor. 1:21). The psychological sequence is clearly stated in Scripture in different places, first in Isa. 6:9-10, as seeing with the eyes, hearing with the ears, understanding with the heart, and turning again: that is, seeing and/or hearing the Gospel message leads to understanding, understanding leads to believing, and believing in turn leads to turning again (repentance), and the entire process culminates in remission, justification, forgiveness, etc., ("turn again, and be healed"). Scripturally speaking, conversion is not mystical—it is definitely psychological. (Cf. Matt. 13:14-15, John 12:40, Acts 28:25-27, Rom. 11:8, etc.). Direct contact with the Word of the testimony, by seeing, hearing, etc., is the first step in conversion. The Gospel is not *a* power, nor *one of* the powers, but it is "*the power* of God unto salvation to every one that believeth" (Rom. 1:16). Hence it follows that "whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." "How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach,

except they be sent?" (Rom. 10:13-15). The whole missionary and evangelistic enterprise of the church is predicated upon the fact that the raw material for thought, and hence in the spiritual realm for faith, is provided by sense-perception (*i.e.*, sensations): as Aristotle put it long ago (in substance), Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the sense, that is, that did not have its beginnings in sense-perception. This view was maintained by Thomas Aquinas in medieval philosophy, and in modern philosophy by John Locke and Immanuel Kant. This view was again reaffirmed by Alexander Campbell in his debate with the Communist, Robert Owen, held in Cincinnati, in April, 1829. In this debate, Campbell spoke as follows:

> Now it is only necessary to name these five senses, and their respective uses, in order to discover in them all that beneficence, wisdom, and design which suggest the idea of a supremely intelligent First Cause, manifesting its wisdom and benevolence in the animal organization of man, to discover that man has been endowed by his Creator with an organization which enables him to elicit every valuable property of matter. [The five senses indicated here, as specifically named by Mr. Campbell, were the traditional ones, viz., sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.] We discover an admirable adaptation of these senses to the conception of all ideas of colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and tacts; and that all our intelligence on these subjects is derived through these five channels. The conclusion, therefore, from these premises, is, that a man born without any one of these senses, must ever remain destitute of all ideas derivable through it; that a man born deaf, dumb, blind, and without tactability, has all these avenues to intelligence closed up, and must therefore remain an idiot all his lifetime.

After developing this conclusion specifically with reference to each sense named, Campbell concludes:

> The mind forms ideas in accordance with the sensations impressed upon the brain. The mind is perfectly conscious of the existence of these impressions; they are communicated directly to the *sensorium;* and here begins the intellect process of reflecting upon, comparing, and recalling them; then presenting them in different views, separating, abstracting, combining, and generalizing them. All this is in the natural operation of the intellect on the objects presented to it by sensation. Thus it is that we derive our ideas of sensible objects, and thus we begin to reason upon them.[1]

It was Mr. Campbell's thesis in this debate that man has no power *per se to* originate the basic ideas of religion. It was his twofold task, he affirmed, in this debate, to demonstrate "philosophically" two propositions: first, "that it is impossible for man to originate any of those supernatural ideas which are developed

1. *Campbell-Owen Debate*, 149, 151. Published by McQuiddy Printing Co., Nashville, 1957. First published by Standard Publishing Co., Cincinnati, under the title, *Evidences of Christianity*.

in the Christian religion," and, second, that the central point at issue is, "whether we have reasonable grounds to believe the truth and certainty of the apostolic testimony." His contention was that man could never have invented the "ideas of a God, a Spirit, a future state, or of any of the positive institutions of religion . . . the ideas inseparably connected with the words *priest, altar, sacrifice,* etc. . . . ergo, that these ideas and the words used to express them are derivable only from an immediate and direct revelation, man having no power, according to any philosophic analysis of his intellectual powers, to originate any such ideas."

It will thus be seen that the Restoration movement definitely has a philosophical background. Having previously taken the position that sense-perception, by means of which men may apprehend the truth communicated in the "apostolic testimony," and by obedience to which, as the Last Will and Testament of Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, we obtain justification, sanctification, and immortalization—redemption of "spirit and soul and body" (1 Thess. 5:21)—it follows that sensory experience originally could not have been the source of divine revelation as communicated by inspiration of the Spirit through patriarchs, prophets, and Christ and His Apostles; however, this revelation, or rather the record of it, having been made complete in the apostolic testimony (2 Pet. 1:3, Jude 3), therefore "to the law and the testimony" we must go for our knowledge of God's will for our lives. The Word of God, therefore, as read (seen) or preached (heard), hence as presented to our minds through the senses, must be the source and basis of Christian faith and practice. This all points up the fact that *the Restoration Movement does have a philosophical background. In its positive emphasis on the all-sufficiency of the Word, negatively it repudiated all the vagaries and excesses of mysticism.* To the extent that it repudiates feeling states as evidences of regeneration and sanctfication and urges fidelity to "the living oracles" as apprehended by sense-perception, it may truly be designated an *empirical* movement, that is, a movement belonging, like the political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence, in the empirical tradition set by Aristotle and repeated in modern times especially by John Locke. The present writer is in complete agreement with this emphasis. Why, in the name of reason, in view of God's having provided us, by inspiration of the Spirit, a "letter," so to speak, to tell us what to do and how to live, should we call on the same Spirit for additional evidence in the

form of a telegram, to support the content of the letter? I Pet. 4:11—"if any man speaketh, speaking as it were oracles of God." Acts 7:38—"our fathers who received living oracles to give unto us." (Cf. Rom. 3:2, Heb. 5:12). 2 Tim. 1:13—"Hold the pattern of sound words." 1 or. 2:13—"combining spiritual things with spiritual words." Luke 16:29—"They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them." Rom. 10:8—"The word is nigh thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart: that is, the word of faith, which we preach." (Cf. Rom. 10:17, 1 Cor. 1:21, Rom. 1:16, Matt. 7:24-27, John 6:63, Luke 21:33, Heb. 4:12, etc., etc.).

We are now ready to inquire: What is the relation between *sensation* and *perception* in man? A very significant series of statements, again from Alexander Campbell, is illuminating, at this point:

> Objects of senses are presented to the infant mind, it perceives them, begins to reflect upon them, and after exercising its power of discrimination, it arrives at certain conclusions about them. And this leads us to notice the intellectual powers of man. 1. *Perception,* by which we become acquainted with all things external. 2. *Memory,* by which we are enabled to recall things past. 3. *Consciousness,* which acquaints us with all things internal. Perception has present sensible objects for its province. Memory is the record which we have of the past. But consciousness has respect only to things present. I perceive a numerous assemblage now before me, and I am *conscious* of my own thoughts at the time, I *remember* that there were such and such persons here yesterday. These three powers of perception, memory, and consciousness, are the primary powers of the mind.[1]

But—how is sensation related to perception? A sensation, we repeat, is a physiological event, in the neurosensory system. Sensations, moreover, are *atomistic,* that is, each originates through *its own* channel of excitation. (One does not hear by way of the optic nerve, nor does one see by way of the auditory nerve.) Vision is effected by means of the optic nerve; sound, by way of the auditory nerve endings; touch, by means of the thousands of nerve endings (receptors) scattered over the surface of the skin; smell, by means of receptors in the nasal cavity; taste, by means of taste buds on the tongue. In addition to these, there are innumerable kinesthetic receptors, pain receptors, cold and warmth receptors, and millions of internal sense receptors scattered throughout the inner linings of the body. What, then, is the mysterious power in man which gathers up these different excitations of the nervous system and unifies them into the *perception* of a thing as an *object,* preserves the perception in the form of an *image,* and in addition to all this,

1. *Op. cit.,* 153

vests the whole process with *meaning?* It would seem to be a process, like the vital process, designed to be experienced only but never to be defined. (Who can define the infinitive "to be"? "To exist," do you say? But this is only a synonym, not a definition.) Aristotle called this power, "active intellect." The process, however named, is conclusive proof of the unceasing activity of mind.

Sensations provide the raw material for this elementary kind of "knowledge," which is to conceive (form in the mind) an idea in which one preceives or apprehends ("seizes," "takes hold of") something. It is to think, *e.g., "apple," "man," "chair," "red," "soft," etc.* Our mental powers are awakened, directly or indirectly, by sensations; our first acquired ideas thus have reference to sensible objects; these primary ideas become the occasions for, and the antecedents of, other ideas and emotions which derive from our higher rational and moral nature. But, it must be remembered, sensations are in themselves operations of the individual neurosensory system, separate impressions of different aspects (qualities) of the thing producing them. (Obviously, then, there must be an external something—which becomes the *object* of cognition—to produce these sensations, or they would not occur. Therefore, we must accept the fact of the existence of the external (physical) world, as a matter of necessary inference; negatively, we must deny the notion that it is illusion.) (Even an illusion must be an illusion of *something,* as a figure, a symbol, an emblem, must be, in any case, a figure or symbol or emblem of *something.* An illusion of nothing is inconceivable.) Physicists would describe these motions in matter which cause sensations in the percipient, by their impact on the nervous system, as *sense data,* or *sensa*: vision, for example, is produced by the refraction of quanta of radiant energy, sound by vibrations in a medium, etc. It seems to lie beyond the possibility of man to determine what the nature of the contact is, between the impinging *sensum* (stimulus) and the responsive nerve-endings of the recipient, in instances of touch, taste, and smell. This is the mystery of the relation between the psychical and the physical (or physiological), a mystery which no doubt will always remain a mystery.

For example, let us imagine an apple lying on the table before us. On looking at it, we experience a sensation of color ("redness"), another of configuration ("roundness"); if we touch the apple, we experience another sensation (that of a

certain quality of "hardness" or "softness," depending on how "ripe" the apple is); and if we bite into the apple, we experience another kind of sensation, that of a certain quality of pleasantness or unpleasantness to the taste ("sweet," "sour," "bitter," and the like). But, obviously, in order to perceive the thing (the apple) *as an object,* some activity within each of us must—and indeed *does*—unite these sensations into the perception of the object *as a whole.* As Gestalt psychologists contend, no analysis of separate percepts can account for the total experience. This internal activity of weaving into a whole the sensations produced by a thing in becoming an object of cognition is properly designated one's *perception* of the object. Now the sensations themselves may be explained as activities, or at least as the result of the activities, of brain and nerve cells. But certainly the perception of the object, the process in which these sensations are unified, cannot be explained solely in terms of cellular processes.

Again, on perceiving an object, one immediately attaches the proper word-symbol (in this case, "apple") to it, the symbol attached by social usage. This, of course, is a phase of the actual perception of the apple, or other object, whatever it may be. This attachment of a word-symbol becomes an elaboration of the perception by a phenomenon known as *consciousness.* This attachment of the conventional word-symbol that serves as identification, simply cannot be explained on the ground of any cellular or other physiological process, for the use of language involves memory and memory images, and in addition gives *meaning* to the perception. It is utterly inconceivable that cells should remain in juxtaposition themselves over a period of years in such a manner as repeatedly to produce the same memory images. Hence, we must conclude that neither the retention of memory images nor their recall can be identified with any cellular process exclusively, and that the phenomena of perception, retention and recall, and the more significant fact of *meaning*, are properly described as "mental" rather than "physical." As the psychologist McDougall has expressed it: "There is no correlate in the brain for meaning in thought."

The jump from sensation to consciousness is the great mystery involved here. D. Elton Trueblood calls it "the leap of faith." It is the leap from the physiological stimulus to the mental interpretation or response. In terms of the sciences involved, it is the leap from physiology to psychology. We affirm,

in this connection, that there is no way, that there will never be found a way, by which psychology can be identified with sheer physiology. Brain and mind are correlated, of course, but they cannot be *identified* as one and the same thing, no matter how desperate may become the efforts of materialists the world over to effect this identification, or to conjure up a name which they can find usable in deceiving mankind into thinking that the human being is *animal only;* when as a matter of fact he may be animal as pertaining to his body ("earthly tabernacle") but he is surely animal *plus* as pertaining to his higher thought processes. *Sensation is not consciousness.* The relation between sensation and consciousness is an inscrutable mystery. And this being true, surely the relation between sensation and *meaning* is one of the most amazing of all the phenomena of human existence!

A distinguished writer in the field of psychology has presented this problem clearly as follows:

> Psychologically, a fine discrimination is made between the processes of sensation and perception. *Sensation,* we have said, is the act of receiving a stimulus by a sense organ. *Perception* is the act of interpreting a stimulus registered in the brain by one or more sensations. . . . To illustrate the difference between sensation and perception, a common analyogy compares a *photograph* of a scene with an artist's *painting* of the scene. The photograph would record the scene as the sense organ *receives* it, whereas the painting depicts the scene as the artist *perceivs* it. Succintly stated, we might say, the eye "receives" while the mind "perceives." Instances of pure sensation in human experiences are rare. If you hear a strange noise, no matter how unusual, you immediately associate it with something familiar. If you see a completely strange and foreign object, you unconsciously attempt to relate it to some form or shape you have seen before. The nearest circumstance to a pure sensation might be the instant in which a color is presented for the first time to a person who has been blind from birth and suddenly gained the power to see. No one of us can look at an object, hear a voice or taste food, and receive these sensations without projecting into them some facet of past experience. At whatever age, the accumulations of a lifetime of all sensory experiences go into our perceptions. An orange might be perceived by an infant as just another colored ball with which to play. To an adult in the United States at this time, it represents a commonplace breakfast fruit served usually in the form of juice. To some youngster in Great Britain during World War II when oranges were very scarce, it would have represented a curiosity and a luxury to be enjoyed in its entirety as a rare treat. Thus, in describing the phenomena of perception, we come to the psychological truism aptly stated by the philosopher Immanuel Kant: "We see things not as they are but as we are." Stated differently, *perception represents our apprehension of a present situation in terms of our past experiences.*[1]

1. Abraham P. Sperling, *Psychology Made Simple,* 38.

Obviously, this author is thinking of *perception* as having meaning, in whatever situation it may occur, of a *functional* rather than *essential* (ontological) character. In this respect his analysis is acceptable. However, existentially considered, an orange, or any other entity, *as such,* in whatever part of the world it may be perceived as an existent and to the extent it is perceived as an existent, will have the same meaning, no matter by what linguistic symbol it may be designated. In any case whatever, *perception* involves *meaning.* Perception as apprehension of a present *object,* therefore, has meaning in terms of our past perceptions of the same object; moreover, in any case whatever, the fact of meaning certainly brings in activity that is beyond the physiological, activity that can truly be defined only as mental. All this accounts for the fact that the mind-body problem is just as pertinent today as it has ever been in the history of human thought. It is the acceptance of this fact which accounts for the rise of *psychosomatic* treatment, in recent years, of many human afflictions. As the late C. E. M. Joad, onetime professor of philosophy, the University of London, has written:

> Common sense holds that a human being is not exclusively a body. He has a body, but he is, it would normally be said, more than his body; and he is more, in virtue of the existence of an immaterial principle which, whether it be called mind, soul, consciousness, or personality, constitutes the reality of his being. This immaterial principle, most people hold, is in some way associated with the body—it is frequently said to reside *in* it—and animates and controls it. . . . Mind and body continually interact in an infinite number of ways: in fact, mind influences body and body mind at every moment of waking life. If I am drunk, I see two lamp-posts instead of one; if I fail to digest my supper, I have a nightmare and see blue devils; if I smoke opium or inhale nitrous oxide gas, I experience celestial visions, pass into a state of beatitude, and discourse with the Almighty and His angels. These are instances of the influence of the body upon the mind. If I see a ghost, my hair stands on end; if I am moved to anger, my face becomes red; if I receive a sudden shock, I turn pale; if I am in dread of a coming ordeal, my mouth becomes dry and the palms of my hand moist. These are instances of the influence of the mind upon the body. The examples just quoted are only extreme and rather obvious cases of what is going on all the time. Many psychologists, indeed, assert that there can be no event in the mind which is not accompanied by some corresponding event in the body, and vice versa, although the corresponding event in the body may be too small to be perceptible by such recording instruments as we at present possess. The apparent interaction between mind and body is, at any rate, a fact beyond dispute.[1]

The interaction is beyond dispute, even though the method of this interaction eludes man's ability to apprehend and explain it. No matter that psychologists take the organismic approach

1. *Guide to Philosophy,* 499-500.

(treating the human being as an integrated whole), they then proceed to classify his motives and acts as "viscerogenic" and "psychogenic." But what do these high-sounding terms designate but *physiological* and *psychological* respectively. Apparently, science has yet to learn that *naming* an event is not *explaining it.* (Theologians seem to be very prone to commit the same fallacy also.)

This interaction, as pointed out in the foregoing excerpt, takes place in other most significant ways. The student, for example, does not leave the room after class until he "makes up his mind" to propel his feet toward the door; the baseball pitcher throws the ball if and when and how he "makes up his mind" to throw it in relation to the body of the man at bat. One's feet do not *per se* move one's body across the floor; they move only when something within—call it soul, mind, will, or self, as you will—*moves them.* As Dr. Rudolph Otto has written:

> For a manifestation of the influence exerted by the psychical upon the physical we need in fact go no farther than the power of our will to move our body—the power, that is, of a spiritual cause to bring about a mechanical effect. This assuredly is an absolutely insoluble riddle, and it is only the fact that we have grown so used to it that prevents it from seeming a "miracle" to us.[1]

Gen. 2:7—"Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." Here we have it—the organismic approach to the study and understanding of man (the *vogue in psychology everywhere today*); we find that this organismic approach is in harmony with the Scripture. Yet as man he is an integrated unity of matter, the dust of the ground (the same elements of which all things material are constituted) and spirit, the Breath of God); moreover, as a unity, a body-spirit unity, he is to be known as a *living soul;* the saints, moreover, will be individual body-spirit unities in heaven, the only difference being that they will be clothed in "spiritual" bodies as a result of resurrection, revivification and glorification (cf. 1 Cor. 15:35-56, 2 Cor. 5:1-10; Rom. 2:7; 8:11, 8:23; Phil. 3:20-21, etc.). Rev. 20:4—"I saw the souls of them that had been beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and for the word of God," etc. Note that, at the Marriage Supper of the Lamb, the redeemed shall be clothed in "fine linen, bright and pure; for the fine linen is the righteous acts of the saints" (Rev. 19:8, 14).

In a word, to recap this phase of our subject, it is absurd

1. *The Idea of the Holy*, 214.

to insist that *sensation* and *consciousness* are identical. Our personal experience makes it obvious that this cannot be true: to the contrary, sensation is physiological, whereas consciousness is psychological; sensation is event A, but consciousness is event B. And in some inscrutable manner, sensation, consciousness, *and meaning*, are all interwoven in *perception*. No amount of wishful thinking will—or can—reduce consciousness or meaning to sheer sensation.

4. The Mystery of Life

"And he showed me," writes John the Revelator, "a river of water of life, bright as crystal, proceeding out of the throne of God and of the Lamb" (Rev. 22:1). From what primary Source indeed can the River of Water of Life emanate, but from the one self-existent Living Being, — God?

According to Aristotle,[1] the Totality of Things constitutes a hierarchy of being; our world is a terraced world, so to speak, and not a continuum. At the lowest level is the inanimate creation, the physiochemical foundation of things. At the next level is the plant world, which has this physiochemical basis, *plus* vegetation, *i.e.*, the cellular processes or processes of growth. At the third level is the animal creation, which has the same physiochemical basis and cellular processes, *plus* sensitivity and locomotion. At the highest level is the rational creature, man, characterized by the same physiochemical basis (which he shares with all physical existents), the same cellular processes (which he shares with plants and animals), sensitivity and locomotion (which he shares with the animal orders only), *plus* rationality or reason, which specifies him as man. In Aristotle's own terms, the plant is characterized by "vegetative *psyche*" ("soul"), the animal by "sensitive *psyche*," and man by "rational *psyche*." And above the whole is God who, says Aristotle, must be defined probably as pure Self-thinking Thought.[2] General observation and experience would seem to confirm, in its bold outlines at least, this Aristotelian picture of the Cosmos.

The first step upward in the scale of created being is the step from the level of "non-living" (inanimate, inorganic) substance to the level of "living" (animate, organic) substance.

1. *De Anima.*
2. *Metaphysics*, XII, vii, 1072b 15 ff.